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The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom
Based Account
Victor Tadros*
Violence is the food and drink of criminal law. But as violence
comes in different forms and degrees, there is a question about how
the criminal law should distinguish between different forms of
violence. Some debate has recently emerged which encourages us to
think not only about degrees of violence but also about kinds of
violence. Different forms of violence, it is argued, are morally
distinct from each other. The criminal law, in constructing distinct
offenses of violence, ought to reflect those moral distinctions.' The
way in which violence is perpetrated, the argument goes, is at least
as central to distinguishing between offenses as is degree. For
example, if disfigurement is a kind of violence distinct from bruising,
the criminal law should reflect that distinction. Distinguishing
between types is at least as important as, or perhaps even more
important than, distinguishing between greater and lesser degrees of
disfigurement or greater and lesser degrees of bruising.
Domestic abuse is treated distinctively in the social and political
realm, as well as by the institutions of criminal justice. Literature
concerning domestic abuse in the fields of criminal justice and
criminology is extensive. Yet, substantive criminal lawyers have not
focused on offenses against the person in the literature.' That is so
even though the literature concerning domestic abuse in the fields of
criminal justice and criminology is extensive. By far the most
common way in which domestic abuse tends to appear in discussions
of substantive criminal law is in relation to the defenses available to
victims of domestic abuse who subsequently kill their abuser.
Generally, these cases must be exceptional among those who are
abused.
Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press. Please cite to R. A.
Duff and S. P. Green, Defining Crimes (OUP: Oxford, 1995).
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1. See Jeremy Horder, Rethinking Non-Fatal Offenses Against the Person, 14
Oxford J. Legal Studs. 335 (1994); John Gardner, Rationality and the Rule ofLaw
in Offenses Against the Person, 53 Cambridge L.J. 502 (1994).
2. But see Nicola Lacey, Celia Wells, & Oliver Quick, Reconstructing
Criminal Law: Texts and Materials 629-37 (3d ed. 2003).
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Part of the reason for this lack of real interest in domestic abuse
by substantive criminal lawyers is that there is no specific offense
that distinguishes such behavior in the law. Domestic abuse tends to
be prosecuted using other offenses, including homicide offenses,
sexual or non-sexual offenses against the person, or even breach of
the peace. Undoubtedly, these different offenses mark out different
kinds of domestic abuse. Yet domestic abuse has a character of its
own and is thought of as a social problem (or, by some, a non-
problem) of a particular kind. Hence, it is surprising that calls for a
distinct offense of domestic abuse are infrequent.'
This article hopes to achieve two things. First, it will begin to
ground discussion about whether domestic abuse ought to be
recognized in the criminal law through the creation of a distinct
offense. Does the argument concerning the moral distinctiveness of
offenses support the creation of a distinct offense to cover instances
of domestic abuse? And if a distinct offense cannot be supported on
those grounds, or those grounds alone, how are we to decide whether
there should be a distinct offense concerned with domestic abuse? In
order to address those questions, it will develop some general
thoughts about the project of distinguishing between offenses.
Part I outlines two features that distinguish domestic abuse from
other types of violent conduct. First, domestic abuse occurs within
the context of an intimate relationship. Second, the abuse is
systematic. Part H will suggest that these two features of domestic
abuse have the tendency to erode a distinctive kind of freedom that
individuals ought to have. Philip Pettit's account of freedom as non-
domination will be used to illustrate this erosion of freedom.
Furthermore, it will argue that this erosion of the victim's freedom is
particularly significant because it takes place through the violation of
an expectation of trust. Part I will consider an objection to creating
a distinct offense of domestic abuse based on the idea that distinct
criminal offenses ought to reflect distinctive wrongs. This section
will show that although there may be instances of domestic abuse
which do not have the consequences outlined in Part II, that does not
prevent those consequences from making the wrong of domestic
abuse distinctive. Hence, domestic abuse may be considered
distinctively wrong even though not all instances of domestic abuse
will result in the negative consequences that make it distinctively
3. The idea of a distinct offense was mentioned, but rejected, in a consultation
paper by the UK Government. See Safety and Justice: The Government's
Proposals on Domestic Violence, Cm 5847 (June 2003), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs2/domesticviolence.pdf. For an example of a
distinct offense being created, see Cal. Penal Code § 13700 (West 2004).
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wrong.4 The conclusions will involve a discussion of the potential
practical advantages and disadvantages of a distinct offense of
domestic abuse, arguing that a distinct offense is unlikely to have
very powerful consequences in altering patterns of behavior, but
suggesting that there are some reasons to be optimistic about the
impact of creating such a distinct offense, at least to some degree,
given the way in which criminal evidence works.
I. WHAT IS SIGNIFICANT ABOUT DOMESTIC ABUSE?
Domestic abuse is clearly demarcated from other instances of
violence, both in popular perception and institutional response, and
this might be thought to contribute to an understanding of what is
distinctive about it. Domestic abuse is considered a particular kind
of social problem which demands a particular kind of social response
that is quite distinct from the response to violence in other contexts.
Furthermore, institutional responses to domestic abuse are clearly
different from institutional responses to other forms of violence.
Cases of domestic abuse are probably less likely to result in arrest.5
The victim is often less willing to see a prosecution go ahead6 or to
testify if the prosecution does proceed than are victims of violence in
non-domestic contexts. Domestic abuse may previously have been
seen as "less serious" than other instances of violence by the police
and prosecuting services, although recent studies suggest that social
and institutional evaluation of domestic abuse may currently be in the
process of change.7 Some jurisdictions mandate, or at least strongly
4. See infra Part III.
5. For an overview of the literature in the United States, see Richard B. Felson
& Jeff Ackerman, Arrest for Domestic and other Assaults, 39 Criminology 655
(2001).
6. According to the Crown Prosecution Service guidelines, developed in 2001,
prosecutions will go ahead against the victim's wishes, especially in serious cases
of domestic violence. In her 1998 study, Carolyn Hoyle showed the significance
of a lack of victim participation in prosecution decisions. See Carolyn Hoyle,
Negotiating Domestic Violence: Police, Criminal Justice and Victims (1998).
However, lack of victim participation should not make the evidentiary burden
insurmountable in all cases. See Louise Ellison, Prosecuting Domestic Violence
without Victim Participation, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 834 (2002).
7. Felson and Ackerman's study suggests that the reason for the apparent
leniency is not tolerance for domestic abuse, but rather lack of cooperation on the
part of victims. See Felson & Ackerman, supra note 5; see also Lynette Feder,
Police Handling of Domestic and Nondomestic Assault Calls: Is There a Case for
Discrimination, 44 Crime and Delinquency 335 (1998).
8. For example, the Utah Code provides that
in addition to the arrest powers described in Section 77-7-2, when a peace
officer responds to a domestic violence call and has probable cause to
believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed, the peace
2005]
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recommend, arrest and/or prosecution in domestic abuse cases, which
may explain some changes in trends in policing. This shows that
institutions treat violence in the domestic context differently from
violence in other contexts, although, of course, this may be in part an
attempt to ensure that violence in the domestic context is taken "as
seriously" as violence in other contexts.
Despite the fact that institutional responses to domestic abuse are
clearly distinct from responses to other forms of violence, there is
very little legal recognition of any distinction between domestic
abuse and non-domestic violence, at least as far as offense categories
are concerned. The offenses prosecuted in cases of domestic abuse
are identical to those prosecuted in violence outside of the domestic
context.
The fact that the institutions of criminal justice have been seen as
relatively ineffective in controlling domestic abuse can contribute to
the case for a distinct offense, as we shall see. To preempt a fuller
argument, it may be that the historic failure to respond properly to
domestic abuse should encourage the legislature to consider creating
an offense simply for the reason that it would encourage better
practice in policing and prosecution. However, that case will be
strengthened if there is something distinctively wrongful or harmful
about domestic abuse. For this reason, criminological studies into
domestic abuse ought to be supplemented by normative analysis.
Empirical research alone cannot tell us what constitutes the particular
wrong of domestic abuse, if anything. That is a moral question rather
than a purely empirical question, albeit, as explained later, one whose
answer may build upon empirical observation.
The principal way in which domestic abuse is distinguished from
other forms of violence has to do with the social context in which
violence occurs. The term "domestic" may suggest that the primary
distinguishing mark of domestic abuse is its location: it occurs in the
family home. However, that is not the best way to understand how
domestic abuse is distinctive. Domestic abuse is clearly not marked
by the occurrence of violence in the home-violence in the course of
a domestic burglary is not domestic abuse and violence that takes
place between husband and wife in public may be considered
domestic abuse. Domestic abuse takes place in the context of an
intimate relationship between the abuser and the abused. The
existence of a relationship between the persons is its distinctive
officer shall arrest without a warrant or issue a citation to any person that
he has probable cause to believe has committed an act of domestic
violence.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2(2)(a) (2004).
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feature. To regulate domestic abuse is to regulate relationships, not
locations.9
This also suggests that, as far as domestic abuse goes, there is no
important distinction to be made between the public and the private
sphere. That distinction may be important when it comes to
regulating freedom of expression, for example, but it is not relevant
to distinguishing between different forms of non-consensual violence.
To that extent, this article builds upon the insights of feminist
scholars who have mounted a critique of the traditional liberal
distinction between public and private.'l Domestic abuse is not
exclusively a private matter, both in the sense that it ought to be the
subject of political concern"' and in the sense that it may occur in
public. It is only private in the sense that the relationship may be said
to be particularly private. For this reason, the word "domestic" in the
phrase "domestic abuse" is perhaps unfortunate. There is nothing
particularly domestic about domestic abuse. Despite this weakness,
this article will continue to use the term "domestic abuse" due to its
familiarity.
Domestic abuse, then, is characterized by the fact that violence
occurs within the context of a relationship. One difficulty in
determining the boundaries of the idea has to do with demarcating
which relationships count for the purpose of domestic abuse and
which do not. There may be violence between spouses, between
parents and children, between non-married partners, between
siblings, 2 or between those in more distant familial relationships.
However, violence may also take place in the context of other
ongoing relationships, such as between work colleagues or between
friends. While the latter instances of violence may share some of the
characteristics of domestic abuse, they do not fall within the
paradigmatic idea of domestic abuse. While the term "domestic" is
misleading, it does indicate something else that is generally regarded
as significant in understanding domestic abuse-the abuse occurs
within the context of the family or related relationships. As
9. The word "domestic" in the phrase has also been criticized for making the
violence seem "cosy". See Lacey, Wells, & Quick, supra note 2, at 630.
10. See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Gender, the Public, and the Private, in
Political Theory Today 67 (D. Held ed., 1991); Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice?
Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy, in Unspeakable Subjects:
Feminist Essays in Legal Theory (1998). In the context of domestic abuse, see T.A.
Agikalin, Debunking the Dichotomy of Nonintervention: The Role of the State in
Regulating Domestic Violence, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1045 (2000).
11. On the changing social and political climate which made domestic abuse
part of public concern, see Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights:
Sexuality, Integrity and Criminal Law, in Unspeakable Subjects, supra note 10.
12. Whether this case falls within the popular paradigm of domestic abuse is
controversial, but we shall see some reasons why it should so fall below.
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suggested above, if cases of violence at work, bullying at school, or
violence between friends turn out to constitute the same kind of
wrong as domestic abuse, there is no particular wrong of domestic
abuse. Domestic abuse would merely be an instance of a broader
wrong, the domestic context making a difference that is not
sufficiently significant to be marked out by the distinction between
offenses.
However, while the relationship between the accused and the
victim is one central distinguishing feature of domestic abuse, there
are other features of such abuse that mark it out socially. Perhaps the
most important of these is that violence in the domestic context is
generally seen as being much more likely to be repetitive and
systematic than violence in the non-domestic context,' and indeed
that is considered a reason why the institutional and other social
responses to domestic violence ought to be distinct from responses to
other forms of violence. 14
The repetitive nature of the abuse is also part of the paradigm of
domestic abuse. There is no doubt that a single instance of violence
within the context of a relationship may be very serious. However,
at least part of the reason for this is that a particular instance of
violence is often predictive of further instances of violence in the
context of a relationship. An instance of violence may be seen as
indicative of further underlying features of the relationship,
particularly of male dominance. A recent Home Office study reports
that the average number of incidents of assault perpetrated on a
victim of domestic violence is around five per year.'5 A single
assault within the context of a relationship is probably not
sufficiently distinct from single assaults in other contexts to justify
criminalization as a distinct offense. Furthermore, there are good
reasons, grounded in the presumption of innocence, for the criminal
justice system not to label the perpetrator as a systematic abuser on
the basis that one incidence of violence in the domestic context is an
13. The criminal law does not often criminalize systematic behavior, but see
the Protection from Harassment Act, 1997, c.40 (Eng.).
14. See, e.g., J. Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist
Challenges to Restorative Justice, in Restorative Justice and Family Violence
(Heather Strang & John Braithwhite ed., 2002).
15. CatrionaMirrlees-Black, Domestic Violence: Findings from a New British
Crime Survey Self-completion Questionnaire (HMSO 1999), available at
http://www.homeoffice. gov.uk/rds/pdfs/horsl9l.pdf. See also Evan Stark, From
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 Alb. L. Rev. 1027 (1995). It
is sometimes claimed that domestic abuse is cyclical. See L. Walker, The Battered
Woman (1979). However, that is not characteristic of all domestic abuse situations.
See Royal College of Psychiatrists, Council Report CR102, Domestic Violence
(April 2002), available at http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/publications/cr/
council/cr 102.pdf.
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indication of a pattern of abuse. The victim of a single instance of
violence in a domestic context ought, of course, to have recourse to
the law, but the proper offense to charge, in such a case, is assault.
Therefore, there are two central features of domestic abuse. The
first is that the abuse occurs within the context of an intimate
relationship. The second is that the abuse is systematic. These
features of domestic abuse help to explain problems that criminal
justice agencies have encountered when dealing with domestic abuse,
as well as revealing some of the reasons why their responses have
tended to be inadequate.
First, the unwillingness of the police to intervene in intimate
relationships is commonly cited to explain the failure of the criminal
justice system to properly regulate domestic abuse. This may be in
part a rational response by criminal justice agencies. If the
relationship between the accused and the victim is ongoing, it will
often be difficult to secure a conviction. Convictions in such cases
normally depend on the victim providing evidence against the
accused, which she may be reluctant to do. This may be because of
the victim's fear of the accused or because the victim actively wants
the prosecution not to go ahead. Of course, the police may play a
role, short of securing convictions, which helps to control domestic
abuse.
However, as a consequence of these perceived inadequacies of
the criminal justice system, responses to domestic violence
sometimes focus on negotiation within the domestic context in an
attempt to prevent re-offending without having to resort to the
processes and agencies of criminal justice at all. Some scholars are
critical of this approach, however, claiming that restoration within the
private sphere fails to properly recognize both the nature of domestic
abuse and the social context which helps to foster and support it. 6
But, it may also be the case that domestic abuse fails to attract an
appropriate response from the police for reasons that are more
difficult to rationalize. It may still be that domestic abuse is thought
of as "less serious" than other instances of violence. There may be
an extent to which the police see regulating intimate relationships as
beyond their central role; a lack of training might leave police
officers with little confidence in their ability to respond adequately
and effectively to violence in intimate relationships.17
Secondly, the systematic nature of domestic abuse is often seen
as particularly problematic in terms of prosecution and conviction.
It has generally been regarded as an impediment in prosecution that
16. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination
Processes in Cases of Domestic Violence, in Restorative Justice, supra note 14.
17. For a balanced view, see Hoyle, supra note 6, at 98-99.
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the courts are unable to "see" the systematic nature of abuse for the
reason that any instance of violence is often prosecuted either in
isolation or as one of a short series of instances. This may lead to
lenient sentences where the particular instance ofviolence that results
in prosecution and conviction is not very severe in isolation, but
appears much more severe in context. It is often difficult to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that any particular injury suffered by the
victim was an instance of domestic abuse, particularly where the
victim is unwilling to testify or does not provide very effective
evidence. It is therefore likely to prove difficult to convict the
accused of the full range of abusive conduct even where that conduct
constitutes a series of criminal offenses. Even where a conviction is
achieved, it becomes difficult to impose the kind of sentence that
would effectively protect the victim from further abuse.
Once again, there may well still be practices of prosecutors and
of courts which are more difficult to rationalize. As with the police,
there may still be a tendency to treat domestic abuse as less serious
for the purposes of prosecutorial decision-making and sentencing
than assault on strangers. In some cases it may be that prosecutors
and sentencers are motivated to save relationships that are not worth
saving either by deciding not to prosecute or by imposing light
sentences. This has sometimes led to legislation which mandates
prosecution, even against the wishes of the victim, 8 and severe
sentences in domestic abuse cases.
H. FREEDOM AND DOMESTIC ABUSE
The combination of the two distinctive features of domestic abuse
-it occurs within an intimate relationship and is systematic-make
it distinctively wrong. A particular kind of freedom is often
undermined by domestic abuse, and this effect of domestic abuse is
a significant reason to create a distinct offense for dealing with
domestic abuse. It should be noted, at this stage, that this constitutes
only an indication of an approach that may be taken-an approach
that rests on generalizations from empirical research that may turn
out to be wrong.
Domestic abuse tends to be characterized by the fact that it is
systematic, and this perception of domestic abuse is supported by
empirical data. High levels of repeat violence are reported and are
often coupled with violent threats and other forms of psychological
abuse. Domestic abuse, then, is properly characterized not merely as
18. For a further discussion, see Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist
Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev.
801 (2001).
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an incident of violence in the context of an intimate relationship, but
rather as a course of conduct perpetrated in the context of an intimate
relationship. This feature of domestic violence is key to
understanding the values that it attacks.
Philip Pettit has developed a concept of freedom that can be used
to show how this is so. Pettit argues that, in order to determine how
free someone is, the significant question concerns not the range of
options that the person has, but rather the extent to which, and the
way in which, the person's range of options tracks their interests.
Options, Pettit notes, can be restricted either arbitrarily or non-
arbitrarily. Restriction of an option is non-arbitrary, in Pettit's view,
when that restriction is "forced to track the interests and ideas of the
person suffering the interference."' 9  What freedom requires is
protection against arbitrary control over options rather than against
non-arbitrary control over options.
The first thing worth noting about this conception of freedom is
that it is only indirectly concerned with options. The important
question is not what options a person in fact has, but rather the
conditions under which others can control his options. In line with
the republican tradition in which Pettit places himself, this concept
of freedom is most appropriate to show why slavery undermines
freedom. As Pettit argues, the slave may in fact have a broad range
of options, but another, the master, is in the position to arbitrarily
control that range of options; the master may diminish or increase
them as he sees fit. That the slave is not regarded as free cannot be
a result of the lack of options that he has; he may have a benevolent
master who in fact grants him a broad range of options. Even under
such conditions, however, the slave is not free, for his options are
under the control of another. Freedom, Pettit concludes, is to be in
a condition of non-domination rather than non-interference.
There are two ways in which Pettit's analysis of freedom is
misleading. First, the idea that restrictions on options ought to reflect
the "interests and ideas" of the agent is vague and problematic.
Surely, the value of a person having an option is dependent not
simply upon his interests and ideas, but on his legitimate interests and
ideas.2" This criticism is restricted to the context of political theory
and will not be developed here. Secondly, and more importantly for
our purposes, Pettit sees his conception of freedom as supplanting
rather than supplementing the traditional liberal view of freedom as
non-interference. However, we ought to distinguish between the
19. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government 55
(1998).
20. Pettit's view is usefully scrutinized and fleshed out in H. Richardson,
Democratic Autonomy: Public Reasoning about the Ends ofPolicy Chap. 3 (2002).
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question of how free someone is and the question of whether a
particular restriction on freedom has a negative impact upon them.
Restrictions on options are surely restrictions on freedom, although
some restrictions on our options might not have disvalue and may
even have value.
It is sometimes argued that having an option can never be bad as
one can always choose to not exercise that option.21 But that is not
true.22 Having an option may have disvalue without the exercise of
that option.23 Being a slave may be bad, but being a slave owner is
bad as well. In being a slave owner, one has a degree and kind of
control over another that one ought not to have or want to have.
Having that kind of control defines one's relationship to others in a
way that has active disvalue. In becoming a slave owner, my
freedom increases, but that increase in freedom is of disvalue to me.
As that increase in my range of options does not track my interests,
Pettit does not see it as an increase in freedom at all. That is surely
wrong. My freedom has expanded, albeit not in a way that is
valuable to me.
Now, my claim in this section is that very many warranted and
properly constructed criminal offenses are concerned with protecting
freedom against the reduction of options. However, what
distinguishes domestic abuse is that it may well be concerned with
freedom of the kind characterized by Pettit as non-domination.
Domestic abuse can result in the victim not only having a limited
range of options, but also having her options subject to the
unwarranted and arbitrary control of another person. The victim may
also have her ability to recognize her range of options, assess them,
and choose between them diminished arbitrarily by that other person.
The victim of domestic abuse, on this account, is a person whose
options, and capacity in relation to her options, are controlled by
another; the abuser has the kind of power over the victim's options
that he ought not to have and deprives the victim of the kind of
perceptual and evaluative control over her options that is required for
true freedom.
One example of this is the typical phenomenon in cases of
domestic abuse where the perpetrator responds with extremejealousy
to his partner meeting other people.24 In such cases, the wrong that
21. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 143 (1972).
22. For an expanded account of the potential disvalue of an increase of
freedom, see Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility Chap. 7 (Oxford: UOP, 2005).
23. For additional grounds for this position, see Gerald Dworkin, The Theory
and Practice of Autonomy Chap. 5 (1988).
24. See R. Emerson Dobash, Russell P. Dobash, Kate Cavanagh, & Ruth
Lewis, Research Evaluation of Programmes for Violent Men (Scottish Office
Central Research Unit 1996).
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is done is not just that the partner's liberty to meet certain people is
limited, but also that she does not know who it is that she is entitled
to meet and who she is not entitled to meet. The fact that the
perpetrator responds in an irrational fashion to her social life is not
only restrictive of the options that she has for social interaction.
After all, there may be those who live in isolated areas who suffer
equally on that score. It also restricts the extent to which her social
life is within her control or is sensitive to her character and choices.
This has an impact not only on the relationships that she is not
permitted to pursue, but also on those that she is permitted to pursue.
Furthermore, this impact is strengthened by the fact that victims
of domestic abuse tend to overestimate the degree of power and
control that perpetrators have over their lives; they see the perpetrator
as omnipotent. It is common for victims of domestic abuse to fail to
recognize that there are options available to them to move on from
the abusive relationship." Undoubtedly, this perception is sometimes
accurate,6 but there is also a reported tendency for victims to
underestimate the liberty that they have. From this we can see that
the wrong that is done through domestic abuse is not just that the
defendant denies the victim options, but also that he denies her the
freedom to recognize and exploit the options that she has.27
Finally, victims of domestic abuse tend to blame themselves for
instances of violence by the perpetrator, and such a tendency is likely
to discourage such victims from seeking professional help.2 Clearly,
such a tendency does not involve a diminution in the victim's liberty,
as traditionally understood. However, the fact that such an evaluation
is clearly, and tragically, absurd is also evidence of a diminution of
freedom in the distinct sense used here. Perhaps such self-blame is
the result of the misperception that the relationship with her abuser
is within her control or of a desperate hope that it will be so; that she
has, or will have, dominion over what happens to her; or that she is,
or will be, in a relationship of mutual respect and trust. But the
absurdity of self-blame in such circumstances indicates the extent to
which this is not so. It also indicates that the victim's capacity for
evaluation tends to be undermined by domestic abuse, but that
capacity is central to a fully autonomous life.29
25. See C. Hoyle & A. Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence: From
Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment?, 40 Brit. J. Crim. 14 (2000).
26. Id.
27. See Royal College of Psychiatrists, supra note 15.
28. See Mirrlees-Black, supra note 15, at 40-41; C. Hoyle & A. Sanders, supra
note 25.
29. On the relationship between the capacity for evaluation, autonomy and
responsibility, see Tadros, supra note 22, at Chap. 2.
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The reliability of the socio-psychological literature on domestic
abuse is clearly central to the plausibility of this claim. The
psychological literature provides at least significant evidence that
victims of domestic abuse perceive that their options are dominated
by their abusive partners, such that they experience the perpetrator as
having control over their options.3" Sometimes, it is suggested, this
appears to create the impression in the mind of the victim that what
appeared to be an option is in fact not an option. If this is to be
believed, the ability of the victim to assess and choose has been
undermined by the perpetrator. Once again, it is not, or not only, the
existence of choice that is reduced by the perpetrator of domestic
abuse, but rather it is the psychological state required to make
choices that is diminished. Paradoxically, then, the victim of
domestic abuse appears to blame herself for the abuse at the same
time as overestimating the power that her abuser has over her.
As suggested earlier, this is still insufficient to mark out domestic
abuse as morally distinctive, for it may be that such psychological
effects are caused in other social contexts. There are other sources
of autonomy and integrity that are threatened in a comparable way by
wrongdoing. For example, many people may develop autonomy and
integrity at work. Such development may be threatened by bullying
in the workplace. Many people may regard a peaceful home
environment as important in a similar way, but that may be
undermined by abusive and noisy neighbors. This may suggest that
there ought to be a more general offense which includes such long
term abuse within it.
Does this press criminalization of the creation of the experiences
that victims of abuse suffer, rather than tying the offense particularly
to the context of relationships? There is a further reason why this
should not be done. It may be that abuse outside of an intimate
relationship can result in the same diminution of autonomy that is
characteristic of victims of domestic abuse, but the context of a
relationship is particular in another way. Long term relationships, be
they with sexual partners or between parents and children, are often
at least hoped to be the site of intimacy and trust, features which are
30. This idea is not intended to reflect the specific claim made by Lenore
Walker in The Battered Woman (1979) and The Battered Women Syndrome (1984)
that such women suffer from "learned helplessness." See Lenore Walker, The
Battered Woman (1979); Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984).
Walker's claims are contested. See Roger F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis, & Megan
Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction
between Justification and Excuse, 1994 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 45; David L. Faigman &
Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 Ariz. L.
Rev. 67 (1997).
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central to the development of autonomy and personal integrity, but
which are also valuable in themselves.
That is not to say that autonomy and personal integrity cannot
develop outside those relationships or that other forms of relationship
are not equally important and legitimate in the lives of some people.
But the trust and intimacy of long term relationships is central to the
development of autonomy and integrity in many lives. In
recognizing the significance of such relationships, the state does not
foreclose other possibilities. It merely reflects the current source of
much that is of value in our society.
Intimacy is valuable in itself. It is central to the depth of one's
relationships. Intimacy requires trust. The expectation of trust in
intimate relationships is obviously dashed through abuse. There is
good reason to suppose that this tends to erode the self-esteem that is
required for autonomy and integrity in one's life in a particularly
powerful way.
Hence, although there is certainly some merit to the idea that
there are different ways in which autonomy and integrity are
undermined by systematic abuse beyond the context of intimate
relationships, there is also good reason to suppose that domestic
abuse is distinctive both in its nature and its consequences. Not only
does the freedom of the victim tend to be eroded in a distinctive way,
but this is done through the demolition of trust, which is a central
value of intimate relationships.
Intimate relationships are often central to an individual's
perception both of their autonomous identity and of their value, yet
that perception is often undermined by domestic abuse.
Consequently, there is at least some good reason to consider domestic
abuse as a particular kind of offense. Such a diminution of freedom,
in Pettit's sense, through destruction of a relationship that is intended
to be built on trust, is common in cases of domestic abuse and
constitutes good reason to distinguish domestic abuse from other
kinds of assault.31
Now, the argument developed so far might give rise to a concern
that has become familiar in discussions about the use of
psychological evidence of the effects of domestic abuse in the context
of criminal defenses. There has been skepticism in that context about
whether there is such a thing as battered woman syndrome and the
31. For an argument of how criminal offenses should implicitly reflect the
diminution of what is valuable in human life in the context of the offense of rape,
see Lacey, supra note 10. See also Victor Tadros, No Consent: A Historical
Critique of the Actus Reus of Rape, 3 Edinburgh L. Rev. 317 (1999). Of course,
that is not to say that the criminal law should become involved whenever there is
a diminution of such intimacy. As discussed later, the value of intimacy can help
to ground the wrong of domestic abuse in spite of this.
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implications of such a syndrome if indeed it is properly identified.
None of the argument so far is intended to support the diagnosis of
such a syndrome.
It may be that such terminology wrongly characterizes victims of
domestic abuse and thereby stigmatizes them.32 However, there is
some reason to be cautious about such claims. The fact that those
suffering from domestic abuse show a tendency to misperceive and
improperly evaluate their circumstances ought not necessarily be
regarded as stigmatic, particularly given the explanation for that
tendency. The fact that such misperception and improper evaluation
is common ought to suggest that they are also ordinary human
responses to systematic violence in the domestic context.
Recognizing a syndrome, however, does not necessarily suggest
otherwise."3 Furthermore, skepticism about the use of such medical
terms might itself flow, in part, from a worrying tendency with regard
to having a syndrome in addition to any lack of capacity that may
result from such a syndrome. These consequences may be stigmatic
by themselves.34
That said, there are undoubtedly some flaws in the original
methodology and the conceptual framework that Lenore Walker used
when developing the concept of battered woman syndrome, which
have been exposed in the literature.35 Such criticisms require at least
a substantial revision of the way in which battered woman syndrome
is to be understood or, possibly, the abandonment of the concept.
Many of those criticisms, however, are leveled specifically at the use
of the concept of battered woman syndrome as evidence to support
defenses for battered women who kill their abusive partners, which
is not intended here. That battered women often fail effectively to
evaluate the options that are available to them, overestimate the
power that their partner has over them, and blame themselves for the
violence that they suffer have not been shown to be false and are well
supported by social and psychological studies. Whether these
phenomena are sufficient to ground a syndrome is another question
which is beyond the scope of this article.
32. The claim is very common, so common as to have become almost casual.
See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Joshua
Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters, in Criminal Law
Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (S. Shute and A.P. Simester ed., 2002).
33. For a similar point, see Jeremy Horder, Killing the Passive Abuser: A
Theoretical Defence, in Criminal Law Theory, supra note 32.
34. For a more extended discussion on the relationship between lack of
capacity and stigma, see Tadros, supra note 22, at Chap. 5.
35. See Schopp, Sturgis, & Sullivan, supra note 30; Faigman & Wright, supra
note 30.
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III. THE PRINCIPLES OF DEFINITION
So far two distinctive features of domestic abuse have been
identified: the context of an intimate relationship and its
systematicity. This article has argued that the socio-psychological
effects of domestic abuse tend to diminish the freedom of the victim
in a distinctive way. This section will consider an objection to
creating a distinct offense of domestic abuse on these grounds. There
are instances of domestic abuse which indeed have these
consequences, but there may also be instances of domestic abuse that
do not. When identifying criminal wrongs, however, we ought to be
searching for what is intrinsically wrong about a certain form of
conduct. A mere tendency to have a particular negative effect is
insufficient to mark out a distinct wrong that is worthy of recognition
by the creation of a new criminal offense. Against this, it can be
argued that an element may be definitional of a particular kind of
wrong without being present in all instances of that wrong. That
there are cases of domestic abuse that do not undermine freedom and
integrity does not necessarily mean that the erosion of freedom and
integrity is not central to identifying the definitional features of the
wrong.
Domestic abuse normally involves some kind of extant criminal
offense being committed. Given that, why create a new criminal
offense? One common reason that is given for distinguishing
between offenses has to do with fair labeling. When the accused is
convicted of a criminal offense, he is not only labeled as a criminal
in general; he is labeled in relation to a particular offense. It is,
therefore, important that his conduct is identified in the appropriate
way, and properly defining criminal offenses is the most obvious way
to do this.
One way in which we might begin to think about the principles
that govern the definition and classification of criminal offenses has
to do with the distinction between different kinds of wrong. Two
wrongs may differ from each other either in degree or in kind.
Stealing £100 is wrong to a different degree from stealing £10, but
stealing money is a different kind of wrong from punching someone
in the face. The special part of the criminal law, it might be argued,
ought to track the differences that exist between kinds of wrong. The
principle of fair labeling, it might be claimed, requires that offense
definitions communicate kinds of wrong rather than mere degree. On
this account, to justify the creation of a distinct offense of domestic
abuse, it must be shown that domestic abuse is different in kind from
other criminal wrongs rather than just different in degree.
It should be noted that it is not inappropriate for the criminal law
to distinguish offenses on the basis of degree as well as of kind. As
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Andrew Ashworth puts it, the principle of fair labeling requires "that
offenses are subdivided and labeled so as to represent fairly the
nature and magnitude of the law-breaking."36 It might be fair to
represent differences in the magnitude of criminal offending even
where there is no difference in the nature of that offending. Hence,
there might be good reason to have an offense of petty theft to
distinguish it from grand theft simply on the basis of the value of
what is stolen. So even if domestic abuse is merely assault
multiplied, that would not rule out the creation of a distinct offense
on the grounds of fair labeling. Nevertheless, if domestic abuse is
wrongful in a distinctive way, that would at least fortify the case for
a distinct criminal offense.
How are we to identify kinds of criminal offending? Two
features that mark out domestic abuse from other kinds of wrongful
conduct have already been identified, but merely identifying such
features does not establish a difference in kind. We might distinguish
assaults of blue-eyed people from assaults on others, but there is no
difference in the kind of wrong perpetrated as between assaults on
those with blue eyes and assaults on others. Wrongs must be
distinguished on the basis of characteristics that are significant.
The relevant kind of significance here is moral significance. It
may be that there are distinctions between instances of wrongdoing
that are considered significant socially, but that are not morally
significant. It may also be that there is a failure socially to recognize
moral differences. Against this, it might be argued that liberal
democracies ought to reflect in their policies the views and values of
the citizenry. But, liberal democracies must also protect minorities
and those without a strong public voice. The fact that states have a
responsibility to protect the vulnerable and minorities may constitute
a reason to criminalize wrongful conduct directed against those
groups, particularly in circumstances where the nature of the wrong
is not recognized even by victims themselves.37
Domestic abuse has always been understood to be distinct from
other kinds of violence, but for the wrong reasons. It has been treated
as less serious, or even as justified or excused violence. Perhaps it
will be argued that the proper response to this fact is to encourage the
criminal justice system to treat domestic abusers in the same way as
other violent offenders, which would militate against a distinct
offense. In response, when assessing the moral significance of a
36. Andrew J. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 89-90 (4th ed. 2003)
(emphasis added).
37. Hence it is misleading for Ashworth to claim that distinctions between
criminal offenses must reflect kinds and degrees of wrongdoing that are "widely
felt." Ashworth, supra note 36, at 89.
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feature of criminal offending, we ought to be careful not to ignore
historical and social factors. At least in this context, Nicola Lacey is
right that theoretical scholarship in criminal law ought properly to be
connected to scholarship in criminal justice and social history. 8 The
very fact that domestic abuse has been treated as less serious than
other forms of assault might help to justify the creation of a distinct
offense. There are at least three further reasons why this might be so.
First, the creation of a distinct offense might be a way to
encourage similar treatment of domestic abusers and other
perpetrators of violence. The creation of a new offense, with the
appropriate publicity and prosecuting and sentencing guidelines,
might encourage officers in the criminal justice system who think and
act as though domestic abuse is "less serious" to reassess their views
or, at least, change their behavior.
Second, the creation of such an offense will send out a message
to perpetrators and victims of domestic abuse that such criminal
offending is to be taken seriously and is the proper subject of public
condemnation. There may be a tendency among abusers and victims
to see domestic abuse as outside the realm of the criminal justice
system altogether,39 and the creation of a distinct offense may help to
change those beliefs.
Third, the creation of a new offense might be a way for the state
to recognize past failures of the criminal justice system to regulate
domestic abuse in a proper way. The creation of a new offense, with
the appropriate sentencing guidelines and publicity, would be a way
to express the fact that the state no longer tolerates domestic abuse,
whereas doing nothing might indicate to some that the state accepts
the status quo. Of course, the creation of a distinct offense is not the
only way in which this could be achieved. Sentencing guidelines for
existing offenses perpetrated in the domestic context and legislation
concerning arrest and prosecution might be other ways to achieve the
same thing.
Thus, even if there is no significant difference in the nature of the
wrong committed between domestic abuse and various other kinds of
criminal violence, a distinct offense might be created simply to mark
the fact that domestic abuse has not been properly policed by the
criminal justice system in the past. Socio-historical research into
38. See Nicola Lacey, In Search of the Responsible Subject: History,
Philosophy and the Social Sciences in Criminal Law Theory, 64 Mod. L. Rev. 350
(2001). See also Victor Tadros, The System of the Criminal Law, 22 Legal Stud.
448 (2002) (suggesting some reasons to qualify this suggestion in the context of
theoretical writing about the general part).
39. See Mirrlees-Black, supra note 15, at Chap. 7. Her research finds that only
seventeen percent of victims of domestic assault considered that a crime had been
perpetrated against them. Id.
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domestic abuse is relevant, then, in supporting the case for a distinct
offense. That research has shown both just how common domestic
abuse is and the inadequacy of the response to such abuse by the
criminal justice system. Those facts are relevant in defending the
case for a distinct offense.
These arguments for a distinct offense, however, are only
intended to supplement the main claim that domestic abuse is
wrongful in a sufficiently distinctive way to merit criminalization.
So far, that argument has been developed using some empirical
claims about the socio-psychological effects that domestic abuse
tends to have, and the suggestion that these effects diminish the
freedom of the victim in a particular respect. The point is not only
that the victim's options are reduced, but also her control over those
options and her ability to appreciate and evaluate them. Furthermore,
this diminution is especially significant when it occurs in the context
of an intimate relationship. Now the article will consider a complex
objection to creating a distinct offense of domestic abuse on these
grounds. The objection concerns both the use of such socio-
psychological research and an argument concerning the intrinsic
nature of wrongs.
It is sometimes claimed that the experience of those suffering
wrongs can tell us relatively little about the nature of wrongs. For
example, in the context of the law of rape, John Gardner and Stephen
Shute rightly point out that the mere fact that a particular event is
experienced as a violation does not entail that it is a violation. Rape
is a particular kind of wrong because the victim is violated rather
than because she experiences that violation. After all, it may be that
some actions are seen as a violation which are not in fact violations
and that other violations go unnoticed. That a violation has occurred
is quite distinct from the experience of that violation. This is shown
most clearly from the fact that a person can be raped without
knowing that they have been, such as when the victim is made
unconscious through drugging.4"
This might lead one to the suggestion that in order to investigate
whether there should be a distinctive offense of domestic abuse we
ought to ignore the effect of domestic abuse on victims. This might
be a consequence of the fact that victims may systematically over or
under react to domestic abuse. A consequence is that the nature and
significance of the wrong, if any, cannot be understood simply by
investigating the effects of domestic abuse.
Nevertheless, we should not be too quick to dismiss the value of
empirical research into the experience of victims of domestic abuse.
40. John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness ofRape, in Oxford Essays
in Jurisprudence (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
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We should distinguish the victims' evaluations of their circumstances
from the general psychological effects of those circumstances on the
victims. To generalize from the argument by Gardner and Shute, the
fact that victims evaluate a particular form of conduct as a distinct
and significant wrong obviously cannot lead us directly to recognize
it as such. The perception of victims that they have been wronged in
a significant way may put us on notice that we should consider the
wrongfulness of what was done to them, but victims do not have
special authority to evaluate wrongs. Victims may be systematically
misled, as Western society was once systematically misled into
thinking that interracial marriage was wrong.
However, that a particular response is common among victims of
a certain kind of behavior might at least put us on notice that a certain
kind of wrong has been perpetrated, even if that response is not
sufficient to demonstrate the distinctiveness or significance of that
wrong. In this context, the fact that it is not uncommon for victims
of domestic violence to experience a diminished sense of freedom,
not only through the practical consequences of that violence but also
through psychological erosion, ought to lead us to consider whether
the wrong of domestic violence constitutes a special kind of attack on
the freedom of the victim.
This might give rise to a further objection. It might be argued
that although domestic abuse tends to have certain psychological
consequences, it will not necessarily have those consequences. If we
only identify the consequences that conduct tends to have, we do not
identify any intrinsic feature of that conduct that could help to
identify it as a distinctive wrong.
Once again, compare Gardner and Shute on rape. The particular
wrong of rape is identified, Gardner and Shute claim, if one can
perceive such wrongful conduct in the absence of any of the harmful
consequences of that conduct. Hence, they argue that the "pure" case
of rape is the case of rape which is "entirely stripped of distracting
epiphenomena" such as the victim's psychological reactions.4 That
would be the case if the rape went entirely unnoticed by the
victim-if she was unconscious during the episode and never found
out. Harms such as the psychological trauma of victims can only be
judged as rational or understandable if they are understood as
responses to the pure wrong of rape. "If nothing was wrong with
being raped apart from the fact that one reacted badly afterwards,
then one had no reason to react badly afterwards." ' 2
Similarly, we might seek to identify what is wrong with domestic
abuse in the absence of the psychological trauma that is suffered by
41. Id. at 197.
42. Id.
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victims. Perhaps it will be claimed that the "pure" case of domestic
abuse is the case in which the victim is not traumatized by the
abuse-where she does not suffer the kind of psychological reaction
that is common in cases of abuse-but that would be a mistake. The
fact that there may be cases of this sort should not incline us to think
that psychological trauma is not central to what is wrong with
domestic abuse. That there are instances of domestic abuse without
psychological trauma does not make psychological trauma merely
epiphenomenal to the wrong of domestic abuse, just as the fact that
there are trunkless elephants does not make trunks merely
epiphenomenally related to elephants in the way that dirt is a mere
epiphenomenon of elephants.
This idea is reflected in the nature of concepts in general. A
family of particular instances may properly fall under one conceptual
umbrella, where there are overlaps between each instance under that
umbrella but no single feature that is present in all instances that is
sufficiently distinctive to define the ambit of the concept. In the
context of distinguishing criminal offenses, the same argument holds
water. It is not necessarily an objection to the creation of a distinct
criminal offense that there is no set of necessary and sufficient
conditions that define the wrong that the offense is intended to track.
A criminal offense might quite properly reflect overlapping values,
or vices, whereby two instances of behavior that fall within that
offense do not share all of the salient and distinctive elements that
make any particular token of the offense wrongful.43 For example, it
is not necessarily problematic to include both intentional but
provoked killings and reckless killings within the category of
manslaughter, even if these killings are wrong in quite different ways.
That the killing was intentional (although provoked) is constitutive
of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct where the defendant
utilizes the defense of provocation, even if an intention to kill is a not
necessary condition for properly convicting any defendant of
manslaughter.
It might be, however, that there is a paradigm of an offense where
conduct which is sufficiently close to the paradigm is also worthy of
conviction of that offense even if a significant element of the
paradigm case is missing. Therefore, it might be that the paradigm
of assault involves physical harm, even if psychological harm or the
threat of physical harm is sufficient in some cases where physical
harm is not present. Once again, in the paradigm case, physical harm
43. See Stephen Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
Kierkegaard 84-87 (2001) (an interpretation of Wittgenstein); see also Alan L.
Bogg & John Stanton-Ife, Protecting the Vulnerable: Legality, Harm and Theft, 23
Legal Stud. 402 (2003) (making the same point in the context of criminal law).
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is constitutive of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct even
if it is not a necessary condition of properly convicting any defendant
of assault. That is not to say, of course, that Gardner and Shute are
mistaken in their analysis of rape in particular, although the infliction
of psychological trauma isbest thought paradigmatic of the wrong of
rape. What is clear is that the idea of pure cases ought not to be
considered a method by which the nature of criminal wrongs can be
investigated in general.
Finally, it might be objected that if the wrong that is being
perpetrated by domestic abuse is the diminution of freedom in the
distinctive way suggested by this article, that should also be a
condition of being convicted of any new offense. The prosecution,
it might be argued, ought to have to show not only that there was
systematic abuse within an intimate relationship between the
defendant and the victim, but also that the victim's freedom was
undermined as suggested earlier.
This ought not to be required of the prosecution. First, it is worth
noting that many other criminal offenses have a loose association
with the harm which they are ultimately intended to prevent. For
example, section 19 of the Firearms Act of 1968 makes it a criminal
offense to carry a firearm together with ammunition in a public place
without lawful authority or reasonable excuse." Now obviously the
central reason why that offense was created is the potential use of the
firearm rather than mere possession. That firearms kill and maim is
used to justify the possession offense, but mere possession itself does
not kill and maim. However, that is no objection to the definition of
the offense. That possession offenses do not.always lead to the harm
that they are intended to control does not mean that possession ought
not to be criminalized at all.45 A very strict reading of the harm
principle might lead some to the conclusion that such offenses are
contrary to principle. The harm principle may not be a proper
principle of criminal law at all, but, even if it is, it does not seem
difficult to provide an argument that possession offenses such as this
help to prevent harm. Consider even the psychological harm that
would be done were everyone to know that possession of firearms
and ammunition in public places was permitted!4 6
44. Firearms Act, 1968, c. 39 (Eng.).
45. See Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate
Offenses, (1995) 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151 (1995).
46. That is not to say that possession offenses have not been extended far too
widely. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and
the Police Power Model of the Criminal Process, in Defining Crimes: The Special
Part of the Criminal Law (Anthony Duff & Stuart Green ed., forthcoming 2005).
Furthermore, consideration has to be given to the presumption of innocence, a
principle which is at least sometimes violated by some possession offenses. See
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Consider section 28 of the Offenses Against the Person Act of
1861, which makes it an offense to unlawfully and maliciously bum,
maim, disfigure, disable, or do grievous bodily harm to any person by
explosive substance.47 Consider disfigurement alone for a moment.
There is good reason to think that it is wrong to disfigure another, but
disfigurement is significantly wrong because of the particular value
that people generally attach to their physical appearance. Now, if
there are cases of disfigurement which cause no distress, say because
the victim likes the look of his scars, surely that is not a reason to
acquit the assailant of the offense created by section 28.
Similarly, in this case, the fact that there are instances of domestic
abuse that do not lead to the diminution of freedom in the way that I
have suggested does not entitle the perpetrators of such abuse to an
acquittal. The diminution of freedom is central to the wrong, and yet
the natural tendency of such conduct to lead to that diminution is
sufficient to justify conviction. The defendant has perpetrated
conduct which often leads to such a diminution of freedom. Indeed,
such an effect is arguably paradigmatic of domestic abuse. That such
a diminution does not in fact come about cannot save him from being
liable for the same offense as those whose conduct has the relevant
harmful consequence.48
IV. CONCLUSION
The response of the criminal justice system to domestic abuse has
long been considered problematic, and for good reason. Domestic
abuse initiatives, such as training programs for police officers, show
that progress can be made in this area. Creating a nominate offense
of domestic abuse can only make a small contribution to improving
the situation further. Ensuring that the substantive criminal law
expresses an appropriate categorization of offenses is important, and
other decisions, such as policing, prosecution, and sentencing
decisions reflect offense categorization at least to some degree.
However, changes in the way in which offenses are categorized, even
quite radical changes, may well not have much of an impact on
policing, prosecution rates, conviction rates, or sentencing in the
context of domestic abuse.49
Victor Tadros & Stephen Tierney, The Presumption of Innocence and the Human
Rights Act, 67 Mod. L. Rev. 402 (2004).
47. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100 (Eng.).
48. None of this should be interpreted in favor of a strict version of the
correspondence principle. The consequences of one's actions are often relevant in
attributing criminal responsibility. See Tadros, supra note 22, at Chap. 3 (arguing
why this is so).
49. See, e.g., Jennifer Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process 186 (2d ed. 2002)
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However, even if the impact of a new offense in improving the
lives of victims of domestic abuse would be modest, that is not to say
that a new offense should not be created. There are what we might
call "symbolic" as well as practical reasons for creating a new
offense. By creating such an offense, at least if it is done in the
appropriate way, the state acknowledges the seriousness of domestic
abuse and its history of failure in dealing with such abuse.
Nevertheless, we can speculate about one or two ways in which
the creation of a new offense might have a practical, as well as a
symbolic, impact. First, nothing advocated in this article ought to be
thought of as necessarily ruling out other approaches within or
outside of the criminal justice process. Clearly, if other methods of
tackling the problem of domestic abuse are effective in reducing the
frequency with which the conduct is perpetrated, there is good reason
to use those methods. Other methods might include using existing
offenses or using institutions outside the criminal justice process
altogether. Obviously, any new offense ought to be a supplement to
existing offenses rather than a replacement, and the existence of a
new offense should not be thought to preclude prosecution using
existing offenses.5" A distinct domestic abuse offense is another
string to the bow of the criminal justice system and can supplement
social responses to domestic abuse beyond that system.
That being said, as has been implied, there are some reasons to
use the criminal justice process that go beyond its effectiveness in
tackling rates of offending in the most direct way. The criminal
justice process has unique power to mark a public recognition of the
wrongful nature of a particular kind of conduct and to stigmatize
those who perpetrate that conduct. Taking domestic abuse outside
the criminal justice system is likely to create or reinforce the
perception that domestic abuse is less "serious" than other kinds of
assault, when what has been argued here is that domestic abuse is
often very serious, and serious in a way that distinguishes it from
other kinds of assault.
It is against this background that we should consider one
important evidential issue that might lead us to conclude that a
specific offense could have some, albeit probably relatively slight,
impact on conviction rates. Superficially, there seems a
straightforward reason not to pin too much hope on an offense that is
concerned with a course of conduct. The argument is as follows.
Achieving a conviction for any single assault in domestic abuse cases
("radical reformers did not sufficiently reckon with the attitudes and practices of
those who administer the law, from police officers to jurors").
50. This deals with the problems mentioned by the British government in
Safety and Justice, supra note 3.
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is often difficult enough. This is particularly so given the reluctance
of some victims of domestic abuse to testify." Proving a course of
conduct is likely to be all the more difficult. Hence, the argument
goes, a new offense is very unlikely to prove useful to prosecutors.
On the other hand, there will be cases in which it is easier to
prove a course of conduct by the defendant against the victim than it
is to prove a single incident. Consider a victim who, seven times in
the last year, has been admitted to a hospital with bruising. Each
time, when asked how the bruising came about, she reports that the
injury was accidental. There is evidence from the neighbors that
sometimes there are aggressive fights, but no further evidence of
violence exists. The victim refuses to testify. Now, for any one of
the seven incidents it might be impossible to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the bruising was caused by an assault on the
victim by her partner. In each case taken individually it might be
plausible that the bruising was caused by an accident, as the victim
reported. However, despite this, there might be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that more than one incident was caused by an
assault on the victim by her partner. Where there are seven instances
of bruising, there may be no reasonable possibility that six of them
were the result of an accident, even if there is a reasonable doubt
about the cause of any one of the seven.
Now, inorder to convict the accused of assault, it would normally
have to be proved that one particular incident was an assault. At least
in Scots law,52 a conviction for any offense requires that the date,
time, and circumstances of the offense must be specified in the
indictment. While there is some flexibility as to how this is done,
there is no authority for a conviction where the prosecution has not
made out, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the circumstances of the
offense, as specified in the indictment, occurred. To prove that a
defendant has engaged in a course of conduct of domestic abuse
against the victim, however, it might not be necessary to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt which incidents were assaults, rather than
accidents. Even where the victim refuses to testify, there may be
sufficient evidence in such cases to convict the accused of an offense
of domestic abuse, characterized by a course of conduct, when there
is insufficient evidence to convict him of any single assault.
51. Mandating prosecution against the wishes of the victim may have some
impact on recidivism. See Coker, supra note 18. Some argue that mandating
prosecution in such circumstances is problematic-the victim becomes a victim not
only of her partner, but also of the state. However, if freedom is diminished by
domestic abuse in the way suggested, merely fulfilling the wishes of the victim is
likely to be too crude a way of respecting the victim's autonomy.
52. For a further discussion, see Albert V. Sheehan & David J. Dickson,
Criminal Procedure 122-23 (2d ed. 2003).
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Of course, the evidential problem would be lessened still further,
in such a case, if a conviction of assault was possible without proving
which event constituted the assault, but there may be difficulties in
jumping over the evidential hurdles in a case presented in this way.
If there is insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that any particular incident was an assault, it would be a breach of the
presumption of innocence to warrant the conviction of the defendant
for an assault.53 But that argument cannot apply to the case of
domestic abuse. There, the nature of the offense has to do with
engaging in a course of abuse against the victim, and, on the facts
suggested above, there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was engaged in such a course of conduct against the
victim.54
In summary, we should not think that the only good reason for
creating a new criminal offense is to identify a particular, distinctive
kind of wrong. There is a broader range of concerns that ought to
guide the way in which criminal offenses are identified and divided
up. First, the social context of a particular kind of conduct cannot be
ignored. The fact that a certain kind of conduct has not been properly
recognized, or that it is not properly recognized today, can constitute
a reason for creating a new criminal offense. States have a duty to
protect the vulnerable, the less vocal, and minorities-particularly
those who have suffered historically. A lack of public recognition of
the wrong perpetrated, or of the consequences of that wrong, can,
therefore, be as much a reason to criminalize as public recognition.
Furthermore, that a particular kind of conduct generally has a
certain kind of consequence may be enough reason to criminalize that
kind of conduct distinctively, even if that kind of conduct does not
always have those consequences. This is true of domestic abuse. It
may be that not all victims of domestic abuse experience a reduction
in freedom in the way this article has suggested, but that it is a
reasonably frequent consequence of domestic abuse may be sufficient
to mark out domestic abuse as sufficiently distinct to warrant
criminalization independently of other kinds of assault. Those
reasons stand even if such an experience of a loss of freedom may
come about in other ways.
If this is a good reason to mark out domestic abuse as sufficiently
distinctive to warrant an independent offense, thought needs to be
given to the practical implications of the creation of a new offense.
We should not be overly optimistic about the impact that the creation
53. For a thorough analysis ofevidential problems and solutions where a single
assault is prosecuted, see Ellison, supra note 6.
54. For an account of the relationship between the nature of a criminal offense
and the presumption of innocence, see Tadros & Tierney, supra note 46.
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of a new offense might have on offending rates. However, there is
at least some reason to think that a new offense might help to
overcome some of the evidential hurdles that are faced by those
prosecuting domestic abuse. The problem of domestic abuse, no
doubt, ought to be tackled by a broad ranging set of reforms in the
criminal justice system as a whole and beyond. Some of those
reforms are underway and, at least to a degree, have promoted more
effective and adequate responses to domestic abuse. There is some
good reason to think that the creation of a new offense might have at
least some part to play in such a program of reform.
